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In the last decade, most stateshave targeted certain depressed areasfor
revitalization by providing a combinationof labor and capital tax incen-
tives to firms operating in an"enterprise zone" (EZ). Britain is also
completing a federal program thatdesignated zones for a ten-year pe-
riod. These zone experiments canadd to our understanding of the influ-
ence of tax policy onbusiness investment, and provideinsights into the
design and implementation offederal programs with similar objectives.
This paper summarizes the theoryand empirical evidence on the opera-
tional success of these EZ programs.
Economic theory predicts that theeffect of tax incentives on zone
wages and employmentwill depend on the elasticity ofsupply of factors
to the zone and on theelasticity of demand for zone output.For plausi-
ble parameter values, a laborsubsidy or an equal-cost subsidy to zone
capital and zone resident labor will raise zone wages.A capital subsidy
alone may actually reduce zone wages.Employment effects are likely to
be small if labor is inelasticallysupplied.
The British national EZ program wasintended to promote new eco-
nomic activity in vacant areaswith little or no industry and few resi-
dents. Studies of this programfound that between 50 and 80 percentof
zone businesses wererelocations, at an annual cost perjob of approxi-
mately $15,000.
EZ programs at the state level, by contrast,have an explicit commu-
This paper was prepared for the NBERConference on Tax Policy and the Economy in
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nity revitalization focus andareas with relatively high unemployment
and poverty rates are targeted. Estimates ofthe average cost per zone job
in the United States range from $4,564to $13,000 annually, and about
$31,113 per zone resident job.
While there is much survey evidenceon the states' experiences, rela-
tively few studies have been ableto address the question, how didzones
perform relative to what would have beentheir performance in the ab-
sence of zone designation? Evidence on this issue issummarized for the
state of Indiana, where the zoneprogram appears to have increased inven-
tory investment and reduced unemploymentclaims. But new evidence
based on the 1990 Census of Population indicatesthat the economic well-
being of zone residents in Indiana hasnot appreciably improved.
Enterprise zone programsare geographically targeted tax, expendi-
ture, and regulatory inducements that have beenpart of subnational
economic development strategy since the early 1980s.At least count,
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbiahave established some
form of EZ initiative. While they differin specifics, all the programs
provide tax preferences to capital and/or laborand other development
incentives in an attempt to induce investmentexpansion or location, and
to enhance employment opportunities for residentsin depressed areas.1
EZs have appeared in federal legislationon several occasions over the
last decade, but there is currentlyno federal EZ program. The concept
returned to national prominence most recentlyfollowing the civil distur-
bances in Los Angeles in April and May1992.The U.S. House of Represen-
tatives and Senate of the 103rd Congressadopted H.R. 11. It containeda
pilot program to establish fifty EZsover a five-year period.2 The tax incen-
tives included a 50 percent reduction incapital gains taxes for profits from
interests held in a zone for at least fiveyears (the current maximum rate is
28 percent), a $20,000 immediateexpense deduction for newly purchased
capital equipment, a 15 percent crediton wages paid to zone residents
with a cap of $3,000 per worker annually, andan annual deduction of up
to $25,000 for purchases of stock in businessesinvesting in EZs, up to
$250,000 for each person. President Bush vetoedthe legislation on Novem-
ber4, 1992.
EZs have been criticizedon the grounds that they will be ineffective and
inefficient in stimulating new economicactivity. This criticism is part ofa
longstanding debate on the effects of intersitetax differentials on the
1Most EZs are designated in urban areas, but occasionallyrural areas are selected. Federal
legislation included rural areas as well. See Ericksonand Friedman (1990).
2See Lavatjon and Miller (1992) and the Joint Committeeon Taxation (1992) for a discus-
sion of proposals in 1992.Enterprise Zones39
location of capital investment. If anytax-induced investment only repre-
sents relocation from another state,then tax competition is a zero-sum
game for the country as awhole. In addition, the preferential treatmentof
certain types of investment oremployment within EZs may induce deci-
sions that would be uneconomicin the absence of the tax incentives.
The concern with net capital investment maybe less relevant for EZs
because redistribution even within the state maybe an end in itself.3 If
investment is relocated from local labormarkets with low unemployment
to local labor marketswith higher unemployment, the incentives may
generate efficiency gains for the economy asunderutilized resources are
tapped. Efficiency gains may also resultif reductions in unemployment
produce positive externalities such asreductions in social unrest.
It is also possible that, in addition toencouraging existing businesses
to locate in particulargeographic areas, the incentives may induce the
creation of new businesses thatwould not otherwise have been started.
Such new businesses could producetaxable profits and incomes that
would reduce the revenue cost of the incentives.
The empirical evidence on the effect ofdifferential state taxes on the
location of industrial activity ismixed. Surveys of firm location have
found that firms choose sites on the basisof primary locational factors
(proximity to markets, labor costs,infrastructure, and utility costs),
while tax cost differentials are influential atthe margin when these other
factors are similar at alternative sites.EZ tax incentives may have a
greater influence across localitieswithin a state than across states in a
federal EZ program.
Recent econometric analyses haveemphasized the importance of con-
trolling for interstate differences inpublic service provision when one is
estimating the effects of taxdifferentials While low-tax jurisdictions
directly reduce business costs, high-taxjurisdictions may have highly
skilled workers and a high quality ofpublic services, both of which
indirectly reduce the costs of doingbusiness. Using firm-level data,
Bartik (1985) and L. Papke (1991a) findstatistically significant elas-
ticities of industrial activitywith respect to state and local taxes.4 These
EZ investment may give individuals employmentexperience that enhances their long-
run employability. Thus, even arelatively short-run economic development program may
have long-run effects (see Bartik, 1991).
Bartik finds an elasticity of 0.2 to 0.3of new branch plants with respect to state
corporate tax rates. L. Papke examines start-upfirms in five manufacturing industries, and
estimates elasticities with respect tocombined federal, state, and local tax rates of 1.59
(furniture), 5.62 (communicatiOn equipment),and 15.7 (womens' outerwear). Addi-
tional examples on both sides of the issueinclude Carlton (1979), L. Papke (1987), and
Bartik (1991). Carroll and Wasylenko (1990) reviewseventeen recent studies.40Papke
estimates suggest that EZ incentives might wellgenerate new capital
investment.
The experience and appraisal of EZsare the subject of this paper. The
next section outlines a conceptual framework for analyzingthe effects of
an EZ program inside and outside zone boundaries. Ipresent estimates of
the percentage change inzone wages under several incentive scenarios.
In section II, I discusssome methodological issues involved in measuring
the success of an EZprogram. The British EZ experiment is described in
section III, and section IV surveys the state EZprograms in the United
States. Section V focuses on the EZprogram in Indiana. It is one of the
oldest state programs and has been evaluatedwith a variety of types of
data. New evidence is presentedon the well-being of Indiana zone resi-
dents using 1980 and 1990 Census data. I brieflydiscuss the difficult issue
of program cost effectiveness in section VI andconclude in section 7 with
observations about a proposed federalprogram and some unresolved
issues.
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This section presents a theoretical framework foranalyzing the effects of
EZ incentives on zone wages and employment. First,the effects of EZ
incentives on wages and employment inside thezone are analyzed in a
partial equilibrium model. Estimates of changes inwages and employ-
ment for different EZ wage and capital subsidy packagesare presented,
and the major findings are summarized. Second,while zone tax incen-
tives are confined to zone firms and the factors theyemploy, the effects of
the program may not be. The section concludeswith a general overview of
the implication of an EZ program foraggregate national employment and
investment.
In brief, if zones are small relative to therest of the economy, eco-
nomic theory predicts that the effecton zone wages and employment
will depend on the elasticity of supply of factorsto the zone, and on the
elasticity of demand for zone output. For plausibleparameter values, a
labor subsidy or an equal-cost subsidyto both zone capital and zone
resident labor will raise zone wages. A capital subsidyalone may actu-
ally reduce zone wages. Employment effectsare likely to be small if labor
is inelastically supplied.
If zones are relatively large, and spillovers intothe rest of the economy
are considered, the effects are more difficult to predict. Thenet employ-
ment effects for the nation of a federal EZprogram depend on parame-
ters in both the zone and nonzone sectors of theeconomy: the relative
size of the two sectors, the elasticity of substitutionof factors in the twoEnterprise Zones41
sectors, the elasticity of substitutionof the zone and nonzone products
in consumption, and the aggregateelasticities of supply of factors of
production. The greater the number of areasdesignated EZs, the smaller
the effects on zone wages. If capitalis relatively fixed in the aggregate, as
many empirical studies suggest,the net effect will be to relocate produc-
tive facilities inside the zone.
A. An Overview of the Model
The typical EZ program offers taxincentives that reduce the costs of
businesses located in the zone.These benefits may include subsidies to
capital or labor, or both, or a benefitrelated to total costs (an equal
proportional subsidy for capital and labor).All these subsidies would
tend to increase zone productionexisting zonefirms increase produc-
tion, and new firms begin productionin the zone. "New" zone firms
may be start-upcompanies, but they may also be existingfirms that
relocate or expand into the zone. This outputeffect encourages firms to
employ more of both labor and capital inthe zone.
If only one of the factors is subsidized, orif one is tax-favored, a
substitution effect accompanies the outputeffect. For example, a sub-
sidy to labor alone lowers costsand increases output. This would in-
crease the use of bothcapital and labor. In addition, the firm substitutes
the subsidized labor for capital in itsproduction process. In the case of a
labor subsidy, this substitution effectreinforces the output effect and
encourages increases in employment.
In the case of a capital subsidy,capital becomes relatively less expen-
sive, and firms substitute awayfrom labor and toward capital. While the
output effect of a capital subsidy encouragesfirms to hire more of both
labor and capital, the substitutioneffect causes firms to substitute capital
for labor. A subsidy to capital promotesemployment only through the
output effect and may actuallyreduce employment if the substitution
effect dominates.
The relative magnitudes of the output andsubstitution effects depend
on the elasticityof demand for the product and the easewith which
labor can be substituted for capital in theproduction process. In addi-
tion, the effect of either subsidy on wagesand employment depends on
the labor supply response. The relativelysmall labor supply elasticity
that is suggested by most empirical evidence meansthat either subsidy
would have a larger impact on zone wagesthan on zone employment.
B. Effects Inside the Zone
A partial equilibrium model of zoneproduction (detailed in Appendix 1)
is used to illustrate the effectsof different EZ tax incentives on zone42Papke
wages and employment.5 Zone firms produce output with the laborof
people living inside the zone (zone resident labor),with the labor of
people who commute from outside thezone (nonzone resident labor),
and capital. The model allows for twotypes of labor because many EZ
programs restrict labor subsidies to zone residents. Thetwo types of
labor may have different supply elasticities.Capital is free to flow into
the zone in response to the incentives (i.e.,in infinitely elastic supply) 6
The numerical estimates dependon the output (or product demand),
substitution, and labor supplyresponses. If zone products are close
substitutes for products produced outside of thezone, then the elasticity
of demand for zone products will be relativelylarge. This would be
typical of manufacturing products. However,surveys of zone firms sug-
gest that much zone production is fora local market (trade and services,
e.g.), and heterogeneous enough to havea rather small elasticity of
demand.
In Indiana, for example, 74 percent of totalreceipts of firms participat-
ing in the program is derived fromsources inside the zone. The 1990
Census data for Indiana indicate that while 36percent of zone workers are
employed in manufacturing, 60 percentare employed in a service indus-
try. Consequently, smaller demand elasticitiesmay be typical of most
zone businesses; calculations are presented fora range of elasticities.
For a cost-minimizing firm, the factorsubstitution elasticity is the
percentage change in the ratio of capital to labor dividedby the percent-
age change in the ratio of rate of returnon capital to the wage rate. A
high substitution elasticity indicates thatit is relatively easy to substitute
one input for the other. The common CobbDouglasassumption of
unitary factor substitution elasticity is used in thesecalculations, as sug-
gested by long-run estimates.8
The "spatial mismatch" literature providesan alternative approach to modeling EZs. But
this literature focuses on the movement of peopleand firms to the suburbs as the cause of
employment problems for those who continue to live in theinner cities, especially blacks
(see Holzer, 1991); it may be less relevant to small EZswithin a larger metropolitan area.
6Capital will flow into the zone until the rate ofreturn, net of the subsidy, returns to its
original level.
These smaller trade and service firmsare often the specific target of zone incentives. See,
for example, the statement of Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.,assistant secretary (Tax Policy), Depart-
ment of the Treasury (1992). The emphasis on small firm jobcreation is based on Birch's
(1981) much-popularized finding that small businesseswere the source of most new job
opportunities. Subsequent research indicates that the trueproportion of jobt generated by
smaller firms is close to their actual share of the workforce(Armington and Odle, 1982;
Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff, 1990).
8See Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) fora discussion of the range of estimates.Enterprise Zones43
A high labor supply elasticity meansthat the number of people willing
to work rises substantiallywith a small increase in the wage rate.Empirical
evidence suggests that overall labor supply responseis small.9 However,
the labor of disadvantaged or unskilledworkers may be more elastically
supplied, so again a range of labor supplyelasticities is included.10
Some EZ programs distinguish betweentypes of employees. Zone
labor subsidies might apply, for example, to anyworker employed in the
zone, or the subsidy mayapply only to the wages of zone residents.
Both types of labor subsidies areincluded in the model in Appendix 2.
I illustrate three types of zoneincentive packages below: a subsidy to
zone wages, a subsidy to zonecapital, and an equal-cost subsidy to zone
labor and zone capital. The majorfindings are summarized here:
A subsidy to all labor employedin the zone always increases zone
wages (and employment).The effect on the wage is larger, the larger is
the elasticity of demand (in absolute value),and the smaller is the elas-
ticity of labor supply. If labor supplyis completely inelastic, a 1 percent
increase in the wage subsidy raisesthe wage by 1 percent regardless of
the product demand elasticity. Alabor subsidy targeted to zone resi-
dents increases zone wages by more than ageneral labor subsidy.
A capital subsidy reduces zone wagesat low elasticities of product
demand and low labor supply elasticities.Even for products with rela-
tively elastic demand, the increase inthe zone wage is much smaller
from a 10 percent capital subsidy thanwith a 10 percent labor subsidy.
Most EZ programs involve a subsidy toboth capital and labor. An
equal-cost subsidy to all labor and capitalemployed in the zone will also
reduce zone wages if the demand forthe zone product is completely
inelastic.11 At higher product demandelasticities, an equal-cost subsidy
to both factors increases zone wagesby from 0.33 to 1.54 percent. When
zone residents aretargeted, that is, only their wages are subsidized, an
equal-cost subsidy has a substantiallylarger effect.12 The estimated
increase in zone wages ranges from2.5 to 5.2 percent.
The changes in the price of capital andlabor outside the zone will be
See Hamermesh (1993) and Killingsworth(1983).
10Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) estimate alabor supply elasticity of 0.4 for men in the
lowest decile of the wage distribution.
11Wage income is assumed to be three timesthe size of capital income, so the rate of
wage subsidy is one-thirdthat of the capital subsidy. An equal cost subsidy is,for
example, a 1 percent subsidy on capital and a 0.33percent subsidy to labor. See Appen-
dix 1 for details.
12An equal cost subsidy when capital's share is0.25 and zone-resident labor share is 0.05
is a 1 percent capital subsidy and a 5 percentlabor subsidy.44Papke
small. However, the total effecton nonzone capital or labor returns
will not be.13 For example, Bradford (1978) illustratesthat a subsidy to
capital in a small jurisdiction raises thegross (and net) return to capital
outside of the zone only marginally. But thissmall increase accrues to
all capital in the rest of theeconomy. Thus, the total effect of the EZ
policy on the return to capital is the productof the change in the
return to capital (which is small) times the totalamount of affected
capital (which is large). The total effecton capital income will be of the
same order of magnitude as the sum of EZ subsidies provided.
C. General Equilibrium Effects
The previous partial equilibrium discussiondoes not allow for feedback
effects from nonzone production andnonzone factors of production. If
zones are small relative to the rest of theeconomy, as in state programs
and proposed federal legislation, then thefeedback effects will be negligi-
ble. Gravelle (1992) illustrates thatas zones become larger, however,
general equilibrium effects should be considered.14
The net employment effects will dependon the relative size of the
zone and nonzone sectors, the elasticity of substitution offactors in the
two sectors, the elasticity of substitution of thezone and nonzone prod-
ucts in consumption, and the aggregate elasticities ofsupply of factors of
production.15 Gravelle (1992) illustrates the importanceof the size of the
zone in a general equilibrium analysis of a capital subsidy. Themajor
conclusions follow:
As the number of zones (or fraction of initialoutput eligible for zone
incentives) becomes larger, the impact of thesubsidy on zone wages
and employment becomes smaller. In the limit,if the entire country is
designated a zone, a capital subsidy hasno effect on zone wages.
When the capital subsidy does increasewages, each additional zone
reduces the benefits to existingzones in direct proportion.
Nonzone wages and employment will be affectedby a zone subsidy to
13 Partial equilibrium analysisassumes that zones are small relative to the rest of the
economy. Capital is completely elastically supplied to thezone with no or little change in
the price of capital. Table A-i illustrates that the changein nonzone wages is small.
14While in the partial equilibrium case, capital iselastically supplied to the zone; in this
static general equilibrium framework, capital is fixed inthe aggregate. Gravelle cites sev-
eral empirical studies that fail to finda statistically significant savings response to changes
in the after-tax return to capital. See Ballard (1993) fora review of the evidence.
15 Gravelle (1992) simplifies theanalysis by assuming certain parameter values for these
elasticities. In McLure's (1970) general equilibrium analysisof the locational effects of tax
policy, he substitutes parameters of interjurisdictionalmobility for the traditional Har-
berger assumptions that both factorsare completely mobile.Enterprise Zones45
capital. Whatever the percentage increasein zone wages and employ-
ment, wages and employmentoutside of the zone will fall by an equal
percentage. Aggregate employmentin the country will be unaffected.
The same general outcomewould occur with a general equilibrium
model of a labor subsidy. The more areasthat are designated zones,
the smaller the effects on zone wagesand employment. With very
mobile labor, the result would be torelocate production locations,
with little effect on relative incomes.The primary effect would be
inefficiency in the location of investment.
II. HOW IS ZONE SUCCESSMEASURED?
Zone evaluation dependsprimarily on two factorsprogram goalsand
the nature of the available data.Often, the legislation is unclear about
whether the goal of the zone programis to increase net employment or
investment. Some have argued thatthese areas are in such economic
distress that maintaining the existinglevels of employment and invest-
ment are desirable EZ goals. Thestudies reviewed here typically assume
that the intent of the legislation is tocreate new jobs in the zone, not
merely relocate jobs from outsideof the zone. These jobs may be full-
time, part-time, or of limitedduration, because the legislationtypically
does not specify the type of durationof job it is intended to create.
In practice, zone success isfrequently measured by the amount of
investment undertaken after thedesignation, the increase in the num-
ber of firms in the zone, and thechange in zone employment. Cost-
effectiveness is measured by directspending and foregone revenue per
job created (or, if the goal of the programis zone resident employment,
cost per zone resident job).
Determining which jobs were relocatedfrom outside of the zone pre-
sents a practical difficulty. Thisproblem could be addressed with more
detailed data (tracking employeridentification numbers, e.g.). The key
methodological issue is how to separatethe effects of zone designation
from jobs and investment that arisefrom other factorsfor example,
general upturns in the economy or inthe area surrounding the zone.
Alternatively, which of the measured changesin jobs and investment
are attributablesolely to the zone program?
Survey or case study methodologiesprovide useful information on
zone participation,but they cannot definitively answerthis question.
Firm managers' estimates of netjob creation or investment are subjective,
and even candid managers may havedifficulty attributing a certain num-
ber of new jobs to zone incentivesalone. Surveys of zone administrators
are even moreproblematic, because the responses may beself-serving.46Papke
Positive survey results aloneare not enough to declare a programa suc-
cess, because the difference between a success (net jobcreator) and a
failure (relocated jobs) may reflect differencesin the relative candor of the
respondents.
Econometric analysis is better suited to performingthe "but for the
zone" experiment. If the zone siteswere randomly selected, the effect of
the program could be measured bycomparing the performance of the
experimental and control groups. Actual EZ designation,of course, is
based on economic performance,so the data are nonexperimental. This
sample selection problem can be addressed witha variety of techniques.16
But econometric analyses ofzone success face a practical difficulty.
Conventional economic dataare not available by zone because most
zone boundaries are drawn solely for the purposes of theprogram. In
most states, zones do not coincide withcensus tracts or taxing jurisdic-
tions. As a result, zone areas cannot bepinpointed in standard data
collections. While econometric analysiscan address the sample selection
problem, it must contend witha geographic mismatch problem.
In the next few sections, I presentsurvey and econometric evidence
on zone success in Britain and in the states. The British nationalprogram
was intended to generate new industrial activity inareas with little or no
industry and few residents. State EZprograms, by contrast, typically
designate zones in areas with relatively highunemployment rates where
the residents meet some predeterminedpoverty threshold. Thus, state
EZs have an explicit community revitalizationfocus.
III. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
In 1981, two years into the Thatchergovernment, the United Kingdom
designated eleven areas as EZs, expandingto twenty-four in total in
1983.17 The zones were small relative to U.S.zones, ranging in size from
100 to 900 acres, and consisting ofvacant, unoccupied, or deteriorating
industrial land within an economically decliningcommunity. In contrast
to the state zones in the United States, Britishzone boundaries excluded
both existing business and residentialareas. The U.K. program focused
almost exclusively on industrialdevelopmentcommunity development
was not a specific goal of the program.
The U.K. program includeda four-part, ten-year incentive package:
16See L. Papke (1991b) for a discussion of alternativeestimation techniques.
'Hall (1977) reportedly introduced the original notion ofgeographic areas free of normal
government regulatory policies and import duties ("freeports") ina 1977 address to the Royal Town Planning Institute.Enterprise Zones47
an exemption fromlocal property taxes on industrial andcommercial
property,
a 100 percentallowance (deduction) from corporationand income
taxes for capital expenditures onindustrial and commercial buildings,
an exemption ofsales of undeveloped lands from theDevelopment
Land Tax, and
reductions in administrative requirementssuch as planning permis-
sion and government statisticalreporting for a ten-year period.
The British program alsoincluded public ownership of facilities. Sig-
nificant public-sector involvement was acharacteristic of a number of
zones even beforedesignation, such as direct land ownership ornational-
ized corporate ownership of property orbuildings. For example, in the
zone in Swansea,450 acres of derelict land werereclaimed and new
infrastructure provided beforedesignation.18 In Swansea alone, public
ownership of vacant land rose from47 percent in 1981 to 89 percent in
1986, and public investment overthis period, excluding the EZ incen-
tives of rates relief and capitalallowance, totalled £16 million.
The British experience has beenevaluated in a number of studies,
which include government-fundedmonitoring reports (Roger Tym and
Partners, 1984) and private evaluationsof specific zones.19 Most are de-
tailed firm level surveys andpersonal interviews with entrepreneurs both
inside and outside the zone. Whiledifferent researchers employed differ-
ent measures of zone success,there is remarkable agreement acrossstud-
ies that the British zone programhas failed in its goal of generating new
industrial activity.
The Tym report covers the initialeleven zones. There was a substan-
tial increase in industrial activity inthe zoneby 1987, over 4,300 firms
were operating inthe zones. However, the Tym reportindicates that the
primary effect of the zone wasintrametropolitan relocation-86 percent
of firms relocating in the zone werefrom the same county, and their
managers reported that theyconsidered moving to the zone prior to the
EZ program.
The survey found no differencesbetween employment generation,
investment activities, or productionof companies in zones versus out-
side the zones. The (surprisinglycandid) managers of zone firms re-
sponded via the survey that only about25 percent of new jobs in the
zone were attributed to zonedesignation.
iS See Bromley and Morgan (1985) and Bromley andRees (1988) for details of the Swansea
enterprise zone.
19See B. Rubin and Richards (1993) for adetailed comparison of British and several U.S.
state EZ programs.48Papke
Other studies of individual U.K.zones report similar findings.20 Sum-
marizing, it appears that between 50 and 70percent of zone firms repre-
sented relocations. Zone firmmanagers reported that the property tax
incentive (exemption) was the only significantincentive provided by the
zone program, and frequently ranked this factor third inimportance
after site characteristics and marketaccess.
While the British EZ program hadno explicit labor subsidy, there were
effects on zone employment. About 13,000out of 63,300 zone jobs were
thought to represent net new employment.21None of the studies in-
cludes a figure for disadvantaged workers.
Schwarz and Volgy (1988) estimate that thecost per new job between
1981 and 1986 for the original elevenzones was approximately £45,000, or
$67,000. A follow-up government-sponsoredstudy to the Tym reportcon-
siders job creation in the localeconomy surrounding all twenty-four of the
U.K. zones and estimates the cost at £23,000per new job.22 This estimate
includes jobs created in the localeconomy as well as inside the zone.
Using this figure, Rubin and Richards (1992)calculate the cost of anew
zone job to be £50,000 or $75,000, or between $13,400 and$15,000 on an
annual basis. The government study continuesto find that over 70 per-
cent of jobs created in the zone were relocations fromoutside of the zone.
The shift of firms into zones did havean effect on land prices. Erickson
and Syms (1985) identifya boundary effect on the local property market
from zone designation. They find thata moderate increase in the price of
zone industrial land accompanied the slight increase in businessdevelop-
ment activity in the two zones they examine. Thus,capitalization of
zone incentives into zone land pricescame at the expense of property
bordering the zone where land valuesdeclined.
Citing the uniformity of evidence indicatingthat relocations were the
source of activity in the zones, the Britishgovernment decided to phase
out the EZ program. The tax incentives for theinitial zones expired in
1991, and the last twozones designated will expire in 1999.
IV. STATE ENTERPRISE ZONES
While there is no operational federal EZprogram, thirty-seven states
have enacted EZ programsas part of their economic development poli-
cies. They differ widely inpurpose, coverage, and incentive provisions.
20See Shutt (1984), Barnes and Preston (1985), Thomasand Bromley (1987), Talbot (1988),
and Schwarz and Volgy (1988).
21Great Britain Department of the Environment(1986).
PA Cambridge Economics (1987).For example, Michigan has only one zone, while Louisianahas over 800.
Most programs offer a combination of capital investmentand employ-
ment incentives with generally more resourcesallocated to investment
than employment incentives. Investment incentivesinclude the exemp-
tion of business-related purchases from state salesand use taxes, invest-
ment tax credits, or corporate income orunemployment tax rebates.
Labor subsidies include employer tax credits for all newhires, or zone
resident new hires, employee income tax credits, orjob training tax
credits. Some states also assist firms financially with investmentfunds or
industrial development bonds.
Unlike in the United Kingdom, the criteria for eligibility inthe states
depend upon zone population characteristics. Theseinclude compara-
tive unemployment rates, population levels and trends,poverty status,
median incomes, and percentage of welfare recipients.
Typical U.S. zone characteristics are reported in acomprehensive
survey by Erickson and Friedman(1990, 1991a, 1991b). Most zones
experience negative population growth prior to designationand have
unemployment rates well above the state and national averages.Unem-
ployment in the adjacent communities at the time of zonedesignation
is also generally above these averages. Medianfamily income in the
zones surveyed in 1979 was lessthan 60 percent of the comparable
national figure, and the average proportion of families in poverty was
over three times the national meanand 70 percent higher than that in
the general community. Minority residents comprise 45percent of the
typical EZ population, about double the proportion inthe larger com-
munity and nearly three times the national average.
Zones are relatively small in area and population size.The sample
mean resident population isapproximately 14,500, but the median is
4,500 persons. The median zone size is 1.8 squaremiles, and 75 percent
of the zones contain less than 5.6 square miles,although the mean is
25.6. Zones generally have different land-use patternsthan their sur-
rounding communities. The average share ofindustrial land (18.1 per-
cent) is over twice as large as in the host community,and the share of
commercial land (15.3 percent) is about 70 percent higher thanin their
host communities.
A survey of businesses located in EZs by the Departmentof Housing
and Urban Development found that only 9.1 percenthad relocated from
outside the zone.23 An additional 7.5 percent of thebusiness surveyed
were branches of nonzone firms,26.4 percent were new businesses, 2.2
percent were businesses that reportedly hadbeen kept from closing, and
See Erickson, Friedman, and McCluskey (1989).
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54.8 percent of zone investments represented expansion of existingzone
businesses. The study was not able to determine, with the exception of
the firms that would have closed, whether zone investments would have
occurred in the absence of zone subsidies.
State EZ programs have been evaluated and compared ina number of
studies. As in the United Kingdom, most studies analyzesurvey re-
sponses of managers of zone firms. Program specifics and findings vary
widelyAppendix 1 lists evaluations of individual stateprograms and
multiple-state comparisons. The scope and quality of these evaluations
vary.
Rather than examining the diverse survey data froma large number of
programs, the remainder of this paper focuses on a program for which
there is both detailed longitudinal survey evidence andeconometric
analysis of conventional data. Like many stateprograms, the Indiana EZ
program includes both subsidies to capital and labor. It has been in
operation since l984long enough to generate severalyears of post-EZ
data. Several of the survey studies mentioned earlier have concluded
that Indiana's program is one of the most successful.24
V. THE INDIANA ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAM
Initially, areas in six Indiana central cities were designatedas EZs in
1984; subsequently, others were added to bring the current totalto fif-
teen. Each zone has a ten-year duration, subject to renewal. Firms partici-
pating in the program have been required to report credits claimed,
employment and wage figures, origin of receipts and the like,to the
Indiana Enterprise Zone Board beginning in 1986.
To qualify for consideration and possible designation, thearea must
have an unemployment rate at least 1.5 times theaverage statewide
unemployment rate, and a resident household poverty rateat least 25
percent above the U.S. poverty level. Its resident population must be
between 2,000 and 8,000 persons and its geographicarea between 0.75
and three square miles, all with a continuous boundary. While thereis
no explicit statement of its goals in the original legislation, presumably
the intention of Indiana's program is to increase employment,invest-
ment, and the economic well-being of zone residents. The employment
tax credits provided are similar to those in other states, but the capital
incentives are unusual, as explained below. The tax incentives included
in the Indiana EZ program are the following:
24 See Wilder and B. Rubin (1988) and Sheldon and Elling(1989).Enterprise Zones51
A tax credit against local property taxliability equal to 100 percent of
the property tax imposed on all inventorieslocated in the zone.
A total exemption from the corporate grossincome (receipts) tax of all in-
cremental income (receipts) derived from sourceswithin the zone after
the designation base year; however, ifthe sale giving rise to the incre-
mental income is outside of the zone, it isineligible for the exemption.25
A tax credit of 5 percent of interest incomereceived from loans to zone
businesses and residents for residential orbusiness real property im-
provement. (Existing loans qualify for thecredit, as well as new loans,
and lenders claiming the credit need not belocated in the zone.)
A tax credit for employers hiring zoneresidents equal to 10 percent of
wages with a ceiling of$1,500 per qualified employee.
Zone residents are allowed an income taxdeduction equal to one-half
of their qualified adjusted gross incomewith a ceiling of $7,500.26
Indiana's employment tax credits aretypical of other EZ programs.
The labor incentives are targeted at zoneresidents. The property tax
credit will be valuable to both profitableand unprofitable (i.e., non-
taxpaying) firms alike. However, because thedollar amounts of both the
tax credit for firms and thededuction for employees are capped and not
indexed for inflation, these incentives havelost about 20 percent of their
value since adoption.27
Like other zone programs, the valueof the tax preferences is tilted
heavily toward capital investment. Indiana's mostvaluable investment
incentive from a tax savings standpoint,the inventory tax credit, is an
unusual mechanism for increasing investment.First, most states do not
include inventories in the base of the businesstangible personal prop-
erty tax.28 Eight states do not tax anytangible personal property, and
Indiana's gross income or receipts tax is a tax on instatereceipts. Corporations pay the
greater of this tax and the corporate net incometax (where profits are allocated to the state
based on the conventional three-factor formula). Typically, asmall firm will pay the gross
income tax because no deductions are taken incomputing tax liability. Eligibility for the
exemption requires that the enterprise be legallyorganized as a corporation; sole propri-
etorships, partnerships, and Subchapter S corporationsdo not qualify because they are not
liable for the gross income tax.
26A sixth incentive provides an income tax credit of up to30 percent to individual inves-
tors for the purchase of stock in start-up orexpanding zone businesses. There are no data
indicating that this incentive has ever been used.
27This deterioration in value may explain, in part,the low participation rate in the employ-
ment subsidy. Although 2,779 zone residents wereemployed by 949 registered zone busi-
nesses in 1988, only seventy-sevenfirms (less than 3 percent) claimed wage credits for
employing qualified zone residents. See J. Papke(1990).
28Unlike machinery and equipment, inventories are notdepreciable.52Papke
another twenty-five states specifically exempt inventories.Like Indiana,
neighboring Ohio and Kentucky also tax inventories.
Second, zone programs in other states typically provideincentives for
investment in machinery or equipment rather thaninventories. U.S.
inventories are sharply procyclical, and it is not clear whata large stock
of site-specific inventories represents. Further,the stock of inventories
held (whether inputs, good inprocess, or finished goods) will vary with
the production process of the firm. The valueof the credit will also vary
by type of firm.29 J. Papke and I (1992) calculate,for example, that the
inventory tax credit raises net profit rates (after-taxrates of return) by
from 1 to 7 percent, dependingon the local property tax rate and indus-
try type.
Third, the inventory tax credit applies to the total stockof inventories
in each tax year, not just to incremental values.The 1988 total direct
budgetary cost (revenue foregone) of the IndianaEZ tax preferences
amounted to $13.6 million, of which 84 percentwas attributable to the
inventory property tax credit.
At a minimum, the inventory tax credit enhances the cashflow for firms
that hold inventories. It will also increase profits(decrease losses) of zone
firms and may compensate them for thenoncapitalized profit-reducing
characteristics of their EZ location (e.g., crime). Because theprice of hold-
ing inventories falls, a zone firm will find it profitableto hold a higher level
of inventories than if it were a nonzone firm. Thismay increase economic
activity in the zone and stimulate investment in machineryand equip-
ment that would not have occurred in the absence of theprogram (particu-
larly if production for inventories takes placein the zone).
The characteristics of Indiana's zone firms and theiremployees have
been detailed in five consecutive years of registration data.These charac-
teristics are briefly described in the following.
A. An Overview of Zone Participants
The number and characteristics of participating firms havenot changed
much over the life of the program.31 The number ofparticipating firms
averaged about 1,000 each year. Retailers constitute thelargest single
29For example, instrument manufacturers and retailers hold about25 percent of total
capital in inventories, compared to only 5 percent for manufacturersof petroleum products
and providers of business services. These fractionsare calculated from the Internal Reve-
nue Service's Source Book of Statistics of Income, 1988.
3°In 1991, the Indiana House Ways and Means Committee votedto eliminate the inven-
tory tax credit. See Carlson, (1991).
31J Papke (1990) summarizes the first three years of data. The registration datafrom 1989
and 1990 are presented in preliminary form by Rowings, Powers,and Sigalow (1992).Enterprise Zones53
group, accounting forabout one-third of all participants.Business and
professional service enterprises rankedsecond (about 30 percent), fol-
lowed by manufacturers (about 19percent) and wholesale distributors
(13 percent). Eighty percent offirms are organized as corporations(36
percent of those as S-corporations).About two-thirds of the participants
have fewer than twenty employees.
Firms reported 2,897 new jobscreated in 1988, with 14.7 percent of
those jobs going to zone residents.The preliminary 1990 data indicate
that zone residents comprised 4.1percent of total zone employment,
and 19 percent of all new zone jobs.On average, the zone residents were
paid about half as much as the otheremployees (between $7,000 and
$8,000). The average tax saving perparticipating firm was $13,933 in
1988. The average tax preferenceincreases with the size of the business.
For example, the tax savings for thesmallest firm (fewer than eleven
employees) averaged $4,106, whilethe largest firms (over 100 employ-
ees) claimed $98,493 on average.Manufacturing firms accounted for
over 50 percent ofthe total tax saving.
B. The Employment and InvestmentEffects of Zone Designation
This section summarizes an econometricanalysis of the investment and
employment effects of the IndianaEZ program. Sample selection issues
are discussed. Thissection also illustrates the typesof equations that can
be estimated to isolate the effectscaused by an EZ program alone.
L. Papke (1991b) analyzes theeffects of the Indiana EZ program on
investment and unemployment. Iinclude several specifications designed
to separate the effectsof zone designation from other influences.I exam-
ine two types of capitalinvestmentinventories, which are targetedby
the investment incentives, and investmentin machinery and equipment,
which would likely coincide withincreased economic development. The
investment data are derived fromthe tax records of the taxing districts
surrounding the zone.32
Labor market effects of zonedesignation are estimated with data on
annual unemployment claims. Because oneunemployment office typi-
cally serves an entire city, thegeographical mismatch problem discussed
in section III is more severe forthe unemployment claims data. Butthe
data will reflect any spillover effectsfrom the zone into the community's
labor market.
As discussed in section II, thequestion of EZ effectiveness could be
32A taxing district is a geographic areawithin which property is taxed by the sametaxing
unit and is taxed at the same total rate.It is generally smaller in area than a townshipand is
approximately the same size as an EZ.54Papke
easily addressed if the programswere administered as traditional experi-
ments. But the data are nonexperimental becauseactual EZ designation
is based on economic performance. Nevertheless,if one controls for
sample selection, the data can be usedto address the counterfactual
question, how did zones perform relativeto what their performance
would have been in the absence ofzone designation?
The correct estimation technique foran experiment is determined by
the assumptions about the nature of the data.If zones are selected
randomly, the effects of theprogram are consistently estimated by a
cross-section comparison of means between thecontrol and experimen-
tal groups. No time-series variation isnecessary. Alternatively, if data
are available only for the experimental group, butare available both
before and after the experiment, thenmeans can be compared across
time. In this case, consistent estimation doesnot require random selec-
tion, but it does assume that all changesacross time are attributable
solely to the experimentthereare no external influences.
With panel data on zones before and afterdesignation, as well as
nonzone jurisdictions, aggregate time effectscan control for external
influences over time. Because EZsare selected on the basis of depressed
economic conditions, specifications that allow fordifferent types of sam-
ple selection should be estimated. In particular,the specifications should
allow for EZ designation to be correlatedwith unobservables affecting
economic performance.
The three specifications include jurisdiction fixedeffects. Fixed effects
take account of permanent differencesacross zones that are likely to
influence designation. For example,zones may vary with respect to
industrial composition and characteristics ofthe labor force. In a second
specification, in addition to the fixed effects,selection is allowed to de-
pend on jurisdiction-specific growthrates. This allows for zones to grow
at different rates and allowsprogram designation to depend on these
growth rates.33 The third specification allows designationto be based on
lagged values of the dependent variableas well as the zone-specific time
invariant unobservables (fixed effects). Forexample, this allows zone
designation to depend on the level of employmentor investment in the
previous period.
The most basic model is given by equation(1):
log y = a + 13 + &EZ1 + (1)
For example, M. Rubin (1992) claims that the NewJersey program targets fast growing
areas in preference to slow-growing ones. Slow-growingareas might be targeted in other states.Enterprise Zones55
EZ1 equals 1 if jurisdictioni is a zone in year t, and 0otherwise. The vari-
able Yt is either the annuallevel of inventories, machineryand equipment,
or unemploymentclaims. The coefficient on theEZ dummy, when multi-
plied by 100, measures the percentagechange in inventories, for example,
caused by zone designation. Thisspecification includes a linear timetrend
I3, and the a1scontrol for unobservables that aretime-invariant over the
sample period and may becorrelated with zone designation.
The second specificationsthe random growth ratesmodel given by
log y = a1 + f31t + 132t + 6EZ1+ U11, (2)
allows zone selection to bebased not only on the level ofactivity a1, but
on the growth rates 13h aswell. This generalization isdesirable if, for
example, fast- or slow-growing areas aremore likely to beselected. This
second model is more generalthan the first in that aggregatetime ef-
fects,2t1replace the linear time trend.
Specifications (1) and (2) controlfor varying degrees of sampleselec-
tion, but they imposethe restriction that zone designationhas the same
effect in each year afterdesignation. That is, EZ designationcauses a
permanent shift in thelevel of activity in the zone,relative to its
nonzone state. This maybe too restrictive if the influencesof the incen-
tives change over time. Thisrestriction is relaxed in
log y1 = a1 + f3 + 81EZYR111+ 2EZYR211 + ... +85EZYR51 + u1. (3)
This is an extension of equation(1) that allows the effect of zonedesigna-
tion to vary over its life.The EZ dummy is replaced by aseries of dummy
variables for each year of zonedesignation; for example, EZYR211takes
on the value 1if jurisdiction i has been a zonefor two years in year t, and
0 otherwise.
The third specificationsequation (4), accounts for thepossibility that
designation is based on thelagged value of the dependentvariable be-
fore designation:
log y = a1 + 1321 + plog y,t-i+ 8EZ11 + U11. (4)
The estimated effects aresimilar across specifications.34They indicate
that the Indiana EZ programhas permanently increasedthe value of
inventories by about 8 percentin the zones relative to whatit would
have been without the program.However, the value ofmachinery and
equipment is reduced by about13 percent. The latter couldbe a transi-
See L. Papke (1991b) for adiscussion of estimation techniquesfor these specifications.56Papke
tory one-time adjustment, but theimprecision of the estimates make it
difficult to determine. Evaluatedat the means of the sample, this is
equivalent to about a $5 million drop inthe value of depreciable personal
property, and a $3.2 million increase in thevalue of the inventories.
Zone designationappears also to have a positive impacton the local
labor market. Unemployment claimsdecline by about 19 percent follow-
ing designation, although this findingis more in question because of the
geographic mismatch. At themean of unemployment claims, this is
about 1,500 fewer claimsper year. The evidence for a permanent effect
on unemployment claims is stronger than thatfor capital.
To summarize, itappears that the Indiana zone program has hada positive effect on employment andinventories. A decline in unemploy-
ment claims in the surroundingcommunity, however, does notnecessar- ily imply an increase in theemployment or the economic well-beingof
zone residents. What has happened to theincome of zone residents?
New evidence on theireconomic status based on the 1990 Censusis presented in the following.
C. The Economic Well-being ofZone Residents
The 1980 and 1990census years bracket the operation of the IndianaEZ
program, which, as indicated earlier, beganin 1984. This sectioncom- pares the economic status ofzone residents before the zoneprogram began to a point sixyears after zone designation. These differencesare compared to changes over thesame period of time for nonzone residents
in Indiana.
The decennial Census of Populationand Housing contains dataon
population, labor force, and housingcharacteristics at differentgeo-
graphic levels. These levels include,in decreasing order of size,state, county, minor civil divisionor township, place, census tract, block
group, and block.
Some housing characteristicsand 100 percent populationcounts are
available by census block.36 Othereconomic data (such as income and
labor force characteristics)are available by block group. A geographic
block group consists ofa cluster of blocks within a census tract (or block
numbering area forareas without census tracts) that generallycontain
between 250 and 550 housingunits. The Bureau of the Census Summary
Anecdotal evidence presented ata hearing of the Indiana Legislative Tax Incentive
Study Committee in June 1992 indicatedthat some of the new zone firmsare liquor stores and gun shop warehouses that holdcomparatively large inventories.
Census blocks are small areas boundedon all sides by visible features such as streets,
roads, streams, and railroad tracks, and byinvisible boundaries such as city, town,town- ship, and county limits, property limits,and imaginary extensions of roads.TABLE 1.
Average Indiana Zone Characteristics.
Enterprise Zones57
Source: Author's calculations from theCensus of Population and Housing, 1980, 1990:Summary Tape
File 3 (Indiana).
Note: Zone characteristics are constructedby aggregating over block group data. Percapita income is
from the prior year and reported in 1980dollars. Racial composition characteristics are afraction of total
population. Labor force characteristics are fractionsof workers 16 years and older.
Tape File 3 contains block grouplevel data: 100 percent counts ofpopula-
tion, and economic sampledata weighted to representthe total popula-
tion in the block group.
After identifying the census tractsand blocks in each Indiana zone,I
identified the block groups thatcontain these census blocks. In some
cases, the block groups maycontain blocks that are notdesignated EZs,
but economic data are notavailable at a finer level ofdisaggregation.37
Table 1 contains a summaryof zone resident characteristicsfrom the
1990 census and the change inthese characteristics since the1980 cen-
sus. The changebetween the two census yearsreflects either five or six
years of zone taxbenefits. Zone characteristics areconstructed by aggre-
gating all the block groupswithin each zone in 1980 and 1990.I then
average these data to obtainthe zone characteristics provided inTable 1.
Zones lost population overthis period. Zones lost about 2,300people
and 674 households on average.Per capital income also fellabout 2
percent, to an average of $5,235(1980 dollars). Most zoneresidents are
white, but the white populationfell by about two percentage points to60
percent on average. Blackpopulation increased by one percentagepoint
Population is available by block (Summarytape file 1A) and could beaggregated to
obtain exact zone population. Populationfigures reported here are from block group
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Percent men out of labor force





Percent who work in place ofresidence 68.61 3.9358Papke
TABLE 2.
Industrial Composition of Employmentof Indiana Zone Residents.
Note: See Table 1.
to 36 percent. Zone unemploymentfell by 1.3 percent overallto about 8
percent, with most of the drop occurringin the male unemployment
rate. In addition, the fraction ofpeople who reported "working intheir place of residence" increased byalmost 4 percent (where "place"refers to the Census geographic definition).
Table 2 presents the industrialcomposition of zone resident employ-
mentin 1980 and 1990 and the changes betweenthe two censuses. About
30 percent of residents work inmanufacturing, down sixpercentage
points from 1980. The proportion workingin retail (19 percent), finance
and entertainment services (13percent), and professional, health-,and
education-related services (19 percent)each rose about two percentage
points over this period.
To determine whether the changesin economic status described in
Table 1 were unusual, it is usefulto compare the experience of thezones
with urban nonzones of comparablesize within the state. Asa compari-
son group, I randomly selected blockgroups within twenty-four other
urban Indiana places tocompare with the block groups that containthe
zones designated in 1984 and 1985. Table 3presents the difference be-
tween zones and nonzones in thechanges before and after thezone
program. That is, the change in nonzone characteristicsbetween 1980 and
1990 is subtracted from the change inzone characteristics across thatsame
period. Tables 4 and 5 contain theeconomic characteristics forzone and
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Percent in public administration 3.45 3.20-0.25Enterprise Zones59
TABLE 3.
Difference of Differences: DifferencesBetween Zone Block Changes
Between 1980 and 1990 and NonzoneBlock Changes Between 1980 and
1990 in Indiana.
Source: See Table 1.
Note: Per capita income is from the prior yearand reported in 1980 dollars. Racial composition character-
istics are a fraction of total population. Laborforce characteristics are fractions of workers 16 yearsand
older.
TABLE 4.
Average Indiana Zone BlockCharacteristics.
Source: See Table 1.
Note: These data are for block groups thathad become part of a zone by 1990. Per capita income isfrom
the prior year and reported in 1980 dollars.Racial composition characteristics are a fraction of total




Total block population 614.23 -124.92
Workers 16 years and over 447.81 -85.68
Households 237.21 -38.61
Per capita income $5,196.82 -$116.41
Percent white 49.43 0.01
Percent black 41.01 4.89
Percent unemployed 8.52 -0.73
Percent unemployed men 10.54 -1.30
Percent unemployed women 6.86 -0.23
Percent out of the labor force 40.68 -2.73
Percent men out of labor force 31.73 0.56
Percent women out of labor force 48.37 -4.84
Percent who work in place of residence 69.83 6.36
Zone change from 1980 to 1990 minus
nonzone change from 1980 to1990
Total population -44.58
Workers 16 years and over -27.75
Households -25.63




Percent unemployed men -0.11
Percent unemployed women -0.17
Percent out of the labor force -1.15
Percent men out of labor force -2.10
Percent women out of labor force 0.66
Percent who work in place of residence 0.4260Papke
TABLE 5.
Average Indiana Nonzone Blockcharacteristics.
Source: See Table 1.
Note: These data are for non-zone blockgroups. Per capita income is from the prior year and reportedin 1980 dollars. Racial composition characteristicsare a fraction of total population. Labor force characteris-
tics are fractions of workers 16 years and older.
The difference of differences reportedin Table 3 indicate that the
population loss was greater forzones, but population also fell in non-
zones. On average, block groups in zones lost forty-fivemore people
(twenty-six more households) than didnonzones. Per capita income in
zones in 1980 ($5,313) was substantially less than innonzones ($6,722),
and zone per capita income fellover the ten-year period while nonzone
per capita income rose to $7,290. Unemployment fellmore in zones than
nonzones, but the difference is small (0.11 percent).Fewer zone resi-
dents work in their place of residencerelative to nonzones in 1990 (70
percent vs. 74 percent), but the ratio did increasefractionally more in the
zone (0.42 percent).
These zone effects estimated with thecensus data are much weaker
than those estimated econometrically.One interpretation of this finding
is that the econometric analysis allowedzone selection to depend on
place-specific growth rates. Similar sampleselection corrections cannot
be made with only twoyears of census data. For example, if slower-
growing sites are selected, and the selectionis controlled for, then the
zone program has a large measured effect. This selectioncorrection can-





Total population 844.13 80.34 Workers 16 years and over 650.17 57.93 Households 331.59 12.98 Per capita income $7,289.69 $56.53 Percent white 63.58 0.17 Percent black 24.30 3.60 Percent unemployed 5.58 0.58 Percent unemployed men 6.68 1.19 Percent unemployed women 4.60 0.06 Percent out of the labor force 37.47 1.58 Percent men out of labor force 29.13 2.66 Percent women out of labor force 44.54 5.50 Percent who work in place of residence 73.78 5.94Enterprise Zones61
In summary, while the directionof the zone effects from the census
data are similar to those from theeconometric analysis, the results are
much less strong. In spite of the reductionin unemployment rates in the
zones, the incomenumbers suggest that zone residents are not apprecia-
bly better off with the Indiana EZ program.
VI. MEASURING THECOST-EFFECTIVENESS OF
ENTERPRISE ZONES
This section briefly discusses the limitedevidence on EZ cost effective-
ness. Estimated costs perjob from EZ programs are compared to other
federal employment programs. Cost-effectivenessis measured by direct
spending and foregone revenue per jobcreated or cost per zone resident
job. These measures provide an accountingof the initial level of public
investment required per zone job created.But they are not a full cost-
benefit accounting of the program, becausethey do not account for
second-round feedback effects (such as zoneemployee removal from
welfare and income tax payments). Thedifficulty in determining which
jobs may be relocations has already beendiscussed.38
Generating jobs in distressed areas entails avariety of costs depending
on the type of program.The JOBS program of the late 1960s andearly
1970s subsidized the hiring ofdisadvantaged, unemployed workers.
The gross placement cost was $3,200 (in1969 dollars, or $10,752 in 1990
dollars) per hire.39 Bendick (1981) statesthat costs per job ranged from
$11,570 ($17,058 in $1990) in the UrbanDevelopment Action Grant
Program, through $13,000 ($19,110) perjob in the Business Loan pro-
gram of the EconomicDevelopment Administration, to $60,000 ($88,200)
per job in the local PublicWorks program of the Economic Development
Administration.
Cost per job estimates from zone programs arenot that different from
these earlier U.S. experiences with jobsubsidies. Using survey responses
for number of new zone jobs, M. Rubin(1992) puts New Jersey's cost per
job at between $8,000 and $13,000annually J. Papke (1990) calculates that
the annual cost of an Indiana zone job was$4,564, and $31,113 per zone
resident job. It amounted to over $100,000 per zoneresident job in some
zones.
There is no accounting for the length of job tenure ortype of job. For example, Indiana's
EZ program may encourage annual hiring andfiring because the employment tax credit is
based on annual average hires.
Hamermesh (1978) explains that, while the subsidy wasfairly high, few employers took
advantage of it.62Papke
Calculations of state EZ costs are complicated by the factthat, in some
state programs, local governments bear the brunt of thecost. In New
Jersey, the state funds the EZ program.4° But in Indianathe most gener-
ous tax incentive is the inventory tax credit against the localproperty tax.
The credit reduces the assessed value of taxableproperty in the zone and
shifts the remaining tax burden onto other localproperty sources. The
cost per zone job varies across zones.41 From 1986 to 1988, forexample, the
average cost of the inventory tax credit alone per new job ranged from
$526 to $10,238, and from $1,154 to $67,571 fornew zone resident jobs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Some have argued that the uneven pattern ofeconomic growth across
states and cities is evidence of a market failure and thatgovernment
subsidies may be appropriate toencourage a more geographically even
growth path. EZs can become valuable tools for evaluatingthe effective-
ness of tax incentives as economic development policy, andcan add to
the longstanding debate on the effects oftax competition on the location
of capital investment.
Based on the U.S. state and British experiences, it ispossible to specu-
late about the likely effects ofsome of the proposed federal EZ initia-
tives.First, the capital incentives are likely to increasezone investment.
It is not possible to predict whether this will benet new investment or
relocation of existing businessesour limited U.S.survey evidence on
this issue indicates that start-up firmsaverage about 25 percent of "new"
zone businesses. Capital incentives may revitalize economic activityin
depressed areas, but it may well be at theexpense of neighboring areas.
Data from zone programs suggest that the surroundingcommunity is
struggling economically as well.
State zone programs do not seem to have improvedthe economic
40 The most valuable incentives New Jerseyoffers include business tax credits forem-
ployee hires of public assistance recipients,an exemption from state sales and use taxes on
purchases of tangible personal property, and materials and services forconstruction activi-
ties, and a 50 percent rebate on unemployment insurancetaxes paid by employers on low-
paid employees.
41 For example, the 1987 assessedvalue of the exempt inventories in the Elkhart EZwas
$4.2 million, or 2.7 percent of the total taxable property values inConcord township. To
make up this loss in tax base, $331,000 of taxeswere shifted to the remaining nonexempt
properties. Without the exemption, the gross tax rate in the districtwould have been
$97807 (in dollars per $100 of assessed value); with theexemption, the actual tax rate was
$9.8870, an increase of 1.1 percent. See J. A. Papke (1990) for additionalestimates of the tax
cost shifted to local residents in each zone.
'Green (1990) and Steuerle (1992) make recommendations specificto a federal EZ program.Enterprise Zones63
status of zone residents.Proposed federal wage credits may stand a
better chance of increasing zoneresident income, because the cap is
higher than that in most states, and itmight also be indexed. Certainly,
the chances for improvement are greaterwhen zones are smaller relative
to the rest of the economy. It isunlikely that the proposed credit for
stock purchases will be influential, becausefew zone firms issue stock
specifically for zone location.
Several unresolved issues remain. If investmentin certain geographic
areas is inhibited becausethe perceived riskiness of an area increases the
required cost of capital, EZ tax incentives may atleast partially offset the
high cost of funds. But high costs ofcapital may not be the problem if
investment is discouraged because ofinfrastructure deficiencies or an
unskilled work force.
If the goal of an EZ program is to improvethe economic status of zone
residents, issues relating to theiremployability are relevant. There may
be few income gains if zone businessesrequire labor skills not possessed
by residents of the area. If the businessis attracted to the area to use its
low-skilled, low-wage labor, there may be employmentgrowth without
income growth. Current residents may evenbe displaced by economic
development.
Direct assistance to business may bethe most controversial type of
state and local economic developmentpolicy. Tax concessions or tax
expenditures transfer the discretionaryauthority for a public program to
a nonpublic thirdpartythe firm, in the case of EZs. The employment
and investment effects of these taxexpenditure policies are still being
evaluated.
APPENDIX 1: PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUMANALYSIS OF
ZONE INCENTIVES
Appendix 1 employs a partial equilibriummodel to analyze the effects
on zone wages of alabor subsidy, a capital subsidy, and an equal-cost
subsidy to capital and labor. Laborsubsidies that target zone residents
are also analyzed.
Production in the zone uses threeinputscapital K, zone resident
labor L, and labor from outside of the zone LN.The package of zone tax
incentives may include a subsidy to zonecapital TK, zone resident labor
Tz, and/or nonzonelabor TN expressed as percentages (in decimal)of
factor cost.
The production process in the zone isdescribed by
Q = F(K,LZ,LN). (A-i)64Papke
The demand function for thezone product is described by
Q = f(P). (A-2)
The two labor supply equationsare
L = gz(w) (A3)
LN = gN(w). (A-4)
Capital is assumed to be in infinitely elastic supplyto the zone, or
r = r0. (A-5)
Under the assumptions of perfect competitionand profit maximiza-
tion, the zone economy is summarized by the followingequations:
= (1 -- + azz + (A-6) Q = e,P (A-7) -= oz(zZ'z - d; + dTK - (A-8)
KLN = 0N(WN - dTN + dTK- (A-9)
P= - dr) + aN(WN - drN) + (1 - az - - drK) (A-iO)
= eth (A-li)
= eNwN (A-12)
P = 0, (A-13)
where,P. k, '-Wi L,WN, ZZ'z, and P are the percentage changes in output,
price of output, capital, nonzone resident labor andzone resident labor,
and their wages, respectively, and the after-taxrate of return on capital.
In addition, ais zone labor's share of total income,aw is the nonzone
labor's share of total income,ez and e are the elasticities of labor supply
for the two types of labor,and 0N are the elasticities of substitution
between capital and the two types of labor.
This system results in the following twoequations, which describe the







b11b - b12b21,TABLE A-i.
Subsidizing Zone Resident LaborOnly.*




Panel 1: 1 percent wage subsidy: zoneresidents only
0.0 1.0 0.7353 0.6250 0.0
0.5 1.0 0.7496 0.6423 0.0
1.0 1.0 0.7578 0.6524 0.0
1.5 1.0 0.7632 0.6591 0.0
Panel 2: 1 percent zone capital subsidy
0.0-1.0 -0.7353-0.6250
0.5-0.3593-0.2693-0.2308
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.5 0.2299 0.1754 0.1515



















Source: Author's calculations. See Appendix 1for derivations.
'Percentage change in zone resident wages and nonzoneresident wages for various demand and labor
supply elasticities under three types of EZ tax incentives
where b11 = epaz + (1 - aN)eZ + <OFb12 = ePaN, b21 = epaz, b22 = epaN + (1 -
aZ)eN + a1<o, c1 = (ea + aKcrZ)drz+ ePaNd+ (ePaK - aKcrZ)dTK, and c2 =
eadrz + (ePaN + aKO-N)dTN + (ePaK -aKcrN)dTK.
Land is an input to production aswell, but excluding land from the
model does not significantly alter thecalculated wage effects. A stylized
fact of income distribution theoryis that most of national income is
attributable to labor, and the rest is largely areturn to capital. Because
land is such a small share of total income,its inclusion would not appre-
ciably affect the estimated wage effects.43
Calculations are presented for a rangeof labor supply and demand
elasticities in Tables A-i and A-2. Theestimates are in the form of a
percentage change in wages foreach percentage point change in the
As in Britain, EZ subsidies may increasethe price of zone land if its supply isfairly
inelastic. While the total amount of land inthe zone is fixed in supply, the supply of
industrial land may not be. Exactly how muchthe price of land will rise will depend on its













e 0.0 0.3 0.566Papke
TABLE A-2.
Percentage Change in Zone Wages for VariousDemand and Labor
Supply Elasticities Under Three Types of EZTax Incentives.
Source: Author's calculations. See Appendix 1 for derivations.
subsidy. For example,an estimate of 0.4 means that a one percentage
point increase in the wageor capital subsidy increases the wage by 0.4
percent. The percentage change in thewage can be converted into a
percentage change in employment by multiplying thisestimate by the
elasticity of labor supply.
Case 1: Homogeneous labor
Consider first a type of EZprogram that makes no distinction between
employment of zone residents andnonzone residents. A labor subsidy is
provided for all zone employment. (Thisis a special case of the previous
model.) Both zone andnonzone residents share a common elasticity of
labor supply.44 The estimates of thepercentage change in wages for a
one-percentage point increase in the labor subsidyare presented in
panel 1 of Table A-2.
A subsidy to zone labor always increasesthe wage (and employment).
The effect on the wage is larger, the largerthe elasticity of demand (in
Following Gravelle (1992), a labor share in totaloutput of 0.75 is assumed.
Demand elasticity
ep
Zone labor supply elasticity
eL
0.0 0.3 0.5



































absolute value) and the smaller theelasticity of labor supply. If labor is
completely inelastic, a 1 percent increase inthe wage subsidy raises the
wage by one percent.The increase in the wage is 0.68 percent at a more
elastic labor supply elasticity of 0.3,and product demand elasticity of 0.5.
The resulting percentage change inemployment is found by multiply-
ing the percentage change in the wageby the labor supply elasticity. For
example, a 6.8 percent increase in the wage causes anincrease in employ-
ment of 2.04 percent if the laborsupply elasticity is 0.3.
Panel 2 presents the wage effects of acapital subsidy. A capital sub-
sidy reduces the wage at low elasticitiesof product demand and labor
supply. There is a small positive increasein the wage for products with a
relatively elastic demand, ranging from0.09 percent with inelastic labor
supply to 0.07 percent with a 0.5 laborsupply elasticity.
Most EZ programs involve a subsidy toboth capital and labor. The
effect of an equal-cost subsidy to laborand capital is presented in panel
3. Wage income is assumed to be threetimes the size of capital income,
so the rate of wagesubsidy is one-third that of the capital subsidy.This
combined subsidy will reduce zone wagesif the demand for the zone
product is completely inelastic. If theproduct elasticity is fairly high (1.5)
and labor is still relatively inelastic (0.3), anequal-cost subsidy to capital
and labor (one percent increase in thecapital subsidy combined with a
one-third percent wage subsidy) increases wagesby 1.27 percent.
Case 2: Heterogeneous labor
Often an EZ labor subsidy is providedfor the wages of zone residents
only (Indiana's program and H.R. 11 areexamples). In the previous
model, zone resident labor and nonzoneresident labor are treated as
separate inputs in the production process.Nonzone resident labor is
assumed to be highly mobile across zoneboundaries. (An elasticity of
nonzone labor supply of 1.0 isassumed.)
Zone resident labor's share in total incomeis assumed to be 0.05, and
nonzone resident labor's shareis assumed to be 0.70. This accordswith
survey data from theIndiana program that indicates that zone residents
are about 7 percentof total zone employment (provided zoneresidents
are paid the same wage as nonzoneresidents). If zone residents are paid
half as much as nonzone residents (asIndiana survey data also indicate),
then these income shares correspond to zoneemployees comprising 14
percent of total zone employment.Capital's income share remains 0.25.
The effects on the wages of zoneresidents and nonzone residents of a
labor subsidy, capital subsidy, andequal-cost labor and capital subsidy
are illustrated in TableA-i. When only zone resident wages aresubsi-
dized (panel 1), variation in the elasticityof demand has little effect on68Papke
the change in the wage. If zone resident labor isinelastically supplied, a
1 percent subsidy to their wages alone increases theirwages by 1 percent
(and there is no effect on nonzone resident wages).Zone resident wages
increase by about 0.75 percent if their elasticity oflabor supply is 0.3,
and by about 0.65 percent if their labor supplyis 0.5. The increase in
nonzone resident wages is less than 0.01 percent in allcases. Thus, at
lower elasticities of demand,a subsidy to zone-resident wages only is
more effective at increasing the wages (and employment) ofzone resi-
dents than is a subsidy to all labor employed in thezone.
As in the homogeneous laborcase, a capital subsidy causes firms to
substitute away from both types of labor, andwages to zone residents
and nonzone residents alike fall (panel 2). If theproduct demand is very
elastic (1.5), a capital subsidy increaseszone resident wages by 0.18
percent (with an elasticity of labor supply of 0.3).
An equal-cost subsidy to zone resident laborand capital has a substan-
tially larger effect on the zone residentwage (panel 3). An equal-cost
subsidy corresponds to a 1 percent capital subsidyand a 5 percent labor
subsidy. At a zone resident labor supply of 0.3,an equal-cost subsidy
increases zone-resident wages by about 3percent, regardless of the prod-
uct demand elasticity. If only zone residentwages are subsidized, the EZ
incentive can fund a much largerpercentage increase in the labor sub-
sidy with a correspondingly larger effecton the zone resident wage.45
These results assume highly mobile nonzone resident labor(a labor supply elasticity of
1.0). Calculations not reported here illustrate that the equalcost subsidy estimates are not
appreciably altered by assuming a completely inelastic supplyof nonzone resident labor,
or by assuming that zone-resident and nonzone resident labor havean equal share in total output.APPENDIX 2
Studies of U.S. Enterprise Zones
State Author
Enterprise Zones69
Multiple statesL. Revzan (1983)
R. Funkhouser and E. Lorenz (1987)
M. Bendick, Jr., and D. W. Rasmussen (1986)
M. Brintnall and R. Green (1988)
M. G. Wilder and B. M. Rubin (1988)
R. A. Erickson and S. W. Friedman (1990, 1991a,1991b)
A. Erickson, S. W. Friedman, and R. E. McCluskey (1989)
A. Lavation and E. I. Miller (1992)
B. M. Rubin and M. C. Wilder (1989)
A. W. Sheldon and R. C. Elling (1989)
California E. Litster (1990)
Connecticut Connecticut Department of Economic Development (1985)
Illinois E. R. Jones (1985, 1987)
Indiana J. A. Papke (1988, 1989, 1990)
J. A. Papke and L. E. Papke (1992)
L. E. Papke (1991)
Louisiana A. C. Nelson and R. W. Whelan (1988)
Maryland U. S. General Accounting Office (1988)
New Jersey M. Rubin and R. B. Armstrong (1989)
Ohio S. Staley (1988)
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